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defendants, while at the same time denying other residents of New
Hampshire the use of this jurisdictional tool where defendant is from
a non-Seider forum, arguably denies the latter group equal protection
of the law. It might be argued that such a procedure merely serves to
put New Hampshire residents on an equal footing with Seider forum
parties. However, this one-sided application must fall when one considers that the primary basis for adopting a Seider procedure was to
give residents a convenient forum- a policy which should not be
293
limited to one class of plaintiffs.
Seider spawns too many problems on its own, without the aid of
new variations of the doctrine such as that espoused in Forbes. Such
one-sided applications of Seider by states, even if only defensively, can
only serve to deliver up a host of problems for which neither Seider
courts nor commentators have formulated solutions.
ARTICLE

65-

NOTICE OF PENDENCY

CPLR 6514: Plaintiff may not file a second notice of pendency where
a prior notice was cancelled for failure to serve a timely summons.
Prior to the adoption of the CPLR, New York courts uniformly
held that Where a prior notice of pendency 294 filed against real property was cancelled due to the failure of a plaintiff to serve a timely
293

States are constitutionally permitted to treat classes of people differently but the

classifications
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair anA substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920). While this "rational basis test" has been used primarily to test state
legislation challenged as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961), there would appear to be no reason why it should not apply in like
manner to state decisional law, since this, too, can be viewed as "state action." See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948). Moreover, the Seider doctrine, as enunciated
in New York, has been described as a "judicially created direct action statute." Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S, 844 (1969).
294 Upon its filing with a court and indexing by the clerk of the county in which
the subject property is located, a notice of pendency provides subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers of the property with constructive knowledge of the existence of a claim
concerning it. CPLR 6501. An individual recording a conveyance or encumbrance after
the filing of such notice is "bound by all proceedings taken in the action . . . to the
same extent as if he were a party." Id.
CPLR article 65, which contains the procedure for filing a notice of pendency, was
designed to restrict the common law doctrine of lispendens. See 7A WK&M 1 6501.03.
At common law, a prospective purchaser of property was required to "search the court
calendar to determine whether the land he wished to buy or encumber was subject to
pending litigation." Id.
6501.01. It should be observed that CPLR article 65 applies
only to actions involving real property and not to personal property claims. CPLR 6501.
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summons, a second notice could not be filed despite subsequent compliance with statutory prerequisites. 29 5 In Deerfield Building Corp. v.
Yorkstate Industries, Inc., 296 plaintiff, alleging its inadvertent failure
to properly effect service of process after filing a notice of pendency,
asked the court to reconsider the pre-CPLR policy. The plaintiff
argued that although CPLR 6514(a)29 7 obligated the court to cancel
the notice where the summons had not been properly served, nothing
in the statute barred a second filing. Accordingly, the plaintiff contended that the decision to cancel a second filing rests in the discretion
of the court under the guidelines of CPLR 6514(b), which permits
discretionary cancellation of a notice of pendency if the court finds
that the plaintiff has not commenced or prosecuted an action in good
faith.208
The Supreme Court, Westchester County, held that a court lacked
discretion under CPLR 6514 to permit the filing of a second notice. In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Gagliardi cited the leading decision
in this field, Israelson v. Bradley,299 wherein the Court of Appeals,
upon similar facts, construed CPA 123, the predecessor of CPLR 6514,
as affording a court no authority to allow a second filing.s00 The
Israelson Court viewed the notice of pendency as an "extraordinary
privilege"30 1 granted on an ex parte basis to preserve the subject matter
of the suit. It recognized that such a notice necessarily affected the
295 See Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N.Y. 511, 127 N.E.2d 313 (1955); Lanzoff v. Bader,
13 App. Div. 2d 995, 216 N.Y.S.2d 632 (2d Dep't 1961); Cohan v. Ratkowsky, 43 App. Div.
196, 59 N.Y.S. 344 (Ist Dep't 1899); Lipschutz v. Horton, 55 Misc. 44, 104 N.Y.S. 850
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1907). Where a defendant intentionally avoided service, the bar
to the filing of a second notice of pendency would not arise. See Levy v. Kon, 114 App.
Div. 795, 100 N.Y.S. 205 (2d Dep't 1906).
296 77 Misc. 2d 302, 353 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974).
297 CPLR 6514(a) provides in pertinent part:
The court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it
may require, shall direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if
service of a summons has not been completed within the time limited by section
6512 ....
Pursuant to CPLR 6512, a notice of pendency is normally effective only if a summons
is served within 30 days of the filing of the notice.
298 CPLR 6514(b) provides:
The court, upon motion of any person aggrieved and upon such notice as it may
require, may direct any county clerk to cancel a notice of pendency, if the
plaintiff has not commenced or prosecuted the action in good faith.
2099308 N.Y. 511, 127 NXE.2d 313 (1955).
300 CPA 123 did not mandate cancellation for failure to serve a timely summons,
but rather left the matter to the court's discretion. As a result,
when a court was requested to cancel a notice because of the plaintiff's failure
to serve the summons, it referred to its discretionary power, now found in CPLR
6514(b), to cancel a notice when there was an unreasonable neglect to proceed
in an action.
7A WKg=M
6514.06.
301808 N.Y. at 516, 127 NXE.2d at 315.
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alienability of the subject property, and that unless the statutory terms
were strictly observed, this privilege would be transformed from a
safeguard into a weapon to be used against the owner of real property.
For this reason, the Court of Appeals determined that once this privilege was invoked, a failure to conform to the statutory provisions
foreclosed the granting of an additional notice of pendency. 0 2 Moreover, Justice Gagliardi noted that the Judicial Conference in response
to Israelson, recommended that CPA 123 be amended to make cancellation mandatory where timely service of summons was not accomplished. 03 When this recommendation was included in CPLR 6514,
the last vestige of discretion was extinguished. 0 4
The court's conclusion in Deerfield that a second filing of a
notice of pendency is unauthorized under CPLR 6514(b) is clearly
appropriate. °5 To permit the filing of a second notice would once
again result in the alienability of the subject property being in doubt.
Such a consequence would pose a serious hardship to any defendant
who sought to engage in a transaction involving his property. Additionally, allowing a second notice would provide an opportunity for a
plaintiff to wield the notice as a weapon against a defendant, a clear
misapplication of the purpose of a notice of pendency.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 170.15(3): Conflict of interest as a basis for removal of a criminal action.
Under section 170.15 of the Criminal Procedure Law,30 6 the trial
of a defendant arraigned upon an information, simplified information,
prosecutor's information, or misdemeanor complaint in a city, town, or
802 Id.
808 See SECOND ANNuAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. JuDicIAL CoNFEWMEC 117-20 (1957). In
1957, CPA 123 was amended to include the Judicial Conference's recommendation. See
N.Y. SEss. LA-ws [1957], ch. 877, § 586.
804 The plaintiff in Deerfield sought to compare his position to that of a plaintiff
in a mortgage foreclosure action, since the plaintiff in such an action may file following
the cancellation of a prior notice of pendency. However, the case relied upon by plaintiff, Robbins v. Goldstein, 36 App. Div. 2d 730, 320 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2d Dep't 1971), appeal
dismissed, 28 N.Y.2d 924, 271 N.E.2d 702, 323 N.Y.S.2d 173, stay granted, 30 N.Y.2d 621,
282 N.E.2d 128, 331 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 147, 176-77 (1971), clearly distinguished mortgage foreclosures from other real
property actions involving cancellation of notices of pendency. See generally RPAPL
1331.
805 Since the enactment of the CPLR, two other cases have dealt with the issue
presented in Deerfield; both have held that a second filing was impermissible. See Pelligrina v. Falcone, 160 N.Y.L.J. 101, Nov. 22, 1968, at 17, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County);
Telchman v. Marrazzo, 42 Misc. 2d 354, 247 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963).
306 N.Y. CRmI. PRo. LAw § 170.15 (McKinney Supp. 1974).

